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AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF 
FUNDING FOR AGRICULTURAL LENDING BY COMMERCIAL BANKS
Kenneth C. Carraro and Eddy L. LaDue
Commercial banks have historically played an important role in financing this 
nation's farmers. However, over the past 10 years the U.S. banks' share of total 
agricultural debt has fallen steadily from nearly 31 percent in 1974 to approximately 
21 percent in 1982 (table 1). In New York State, banks' share has fallen from 34 to 23 
percent over the same period, however, in an uneven fashion.
Table 1. MARKET SHARES OF TOTAL AGRICULTURAL DEBT
BY LENDERS U.S. and N.Y.
January 1 (Excluding Farm Households)
Farm Credit System Banks U.S. Govt. Other
U.S. N.Y. U.S. N.Y. U.S. N.Y. U.S. N.Y.
1972 23.8 32.4 28.1 29.3 9.6 7.7 38.5 30.4
1973 24.5 33.1 29.5 30.9 8.3 6.8 37.7 29.0
1974 26.0 31.5 30.9 33.9 6.2 7.0 36.9 27.4
1975 28.4 36.3 29.7 30.0 5.5 6.1 36.4 28.2
1976 29.5 38.9 29.0 25.9 5.9 6.2 35.6 28.9
1977 29.8 38.4 29.0 25.9 6.2 6.9 35.0 28.6
1978 28.6 36.5 27.3 26.8 9.5 8.4 34.6 28.1
1979 28.3 31.7 26.2 25.9 11.0 15.8 34.5 26.5
1980 29.1 28.1 24.0 26.4 12.6 19.2 34.3 26.0
1981 30.9 26.8 22.3 27.6 13.1 19.0 33.7 26.5
1982 32.4 29.4 20.6 22.9 15.2 19.6 31.8 28.0
1983 31.5 28.7 20.6 25.6 18.2 18.7 29.7 27.0
1984 31.5 26.4 22.5 31.2 16.2 16.6 29.8 25.8
Source: Agricultural Finance Databook. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Annual Edition; and Agricultural Situation and Outlook, New York Economic 
Handbook. Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, various issues.
Recent work by Key (1984) found that the extent of market share loss by banks 
in the Northeast is actually greater than the above statistics suggest. He found that a 
significant proportion of the agricultural loan volume reported by the large New York 
City banks represented loans made outside New York State. When the New York City 
banks are excluded, the decline in market share is greater than shown by table 1. A 
continued decline in the bank market share could significantly reduce competition in 
the agricultural credit market. As commercial banks decide, consciously or not, to 
"get out" of farm lending, individual borrowers face a shrinking number of borrowing 
options.
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Under current conditions the Farm Credit System would likely step in and 
proyide the credit most farmers need. However, such an actiori would place 
considerable burden on the Farm Credit Service as the primary, and often sole, 
supplier of agricultural credit, and would place the Farm Credit Service in a monopoly 
or pseudo-monopoly position. It is unlikely that the Farm Credit Service could provide 
the. level of service to agriculture that would be provided by a competitive market 
system. A continued active and growing involvement by banks in agricultural lending 
is critical to competition in agricultural lending, and thus, to the welfare of farm 
borrowers.
Attempts to explain and remedy commercial banks' shrinking presence in 
agricultural financial markets during the late 1970's and early 1980's focused attention 
on the sources of funds utilized by banks to support their agricultural lending 
activities. As of 1983 a large share, 53.2 percent, of the dollar volume of U.S. 
commercial bank agricultural lending was done by small rural banks of less than $50 
million in deposits. Smaller banks have limited access to national money markets and 
therefore rely primarily on locally generated deposits. The economy of a small rural 
bank's locality is often inextricably tied to the health of its agricultural underpinnings. 
Due to the unpredictable nature o f agricultural production and prices, reliance on 
locally generated deposits can produce a highly variable lending base.
To cope with their limited and unpredictable supply of deposits, many small 
banks remain liquid by maintaining a high proportion of deposits in the form of 
government securities. Secondary markets for government securities are well 
developed thereby providing a substantial degree of liquidity for such assets. Banks 
making use of such a liquidity management strategy may refuse or only partially 
satisfy loan requests during periods of either high loan demand or low fund availability. 
Another widely used funding strategy to alleviate liquidity pressure has been for banks 
to sell loans to other financial institutions and to use the proceeds of the sale to fund 
additional loans. Most loan sales, however, are generally not as easily arranged as the 
sale of securities due to the extremely heterogeneous nature of loans.
A major exception to the general lack of secondary markets for loans is in the 
domain of home ownership loans where a number of intermediaries, both public and 
private, exist to purchase mortgage loans from banks. This study will examine the 
programs of two intermediaries that provide such a secondary market for agricultural 
loans. The first is the MABSCO Agricultural Services Incorporated (MASl) agricultural 
loan funding program initiated by bankers of a 12 state region of the midwest. The 
MASI organization functions as an intermediary between member banks and Rabobank, 
a large Dutch bank which has agreed to purchase qualified agricultural loans. The 
MASl program is currently available only in the 12 state region. This analysis assesses 
the feasibility o f developing an institution like MASl to cover the Northeast.
The second alternative is the agricultural loan discounting program offered by 
the Farm Credit System (FCS) through its network of 12 Federal Intermediate Credit 
Banks (FICB). Banks which meet a set of conditions are eligible to sell agricultural 
loans to the FICB. The purpose of this study is to compare these two alternatives to 
the funding techniques currently being utilized by banks with respect to their potential 
to foster improved competition among commercial banks and other agricultural 
lenders to the ultimate benefit of the farm borrowers.
This report first presents background information on New York banks. This 
discussion is followed by a summary of the results of a survey of New York banks
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designed to determine the characteristics of banks that might influence their ability to 
use alternate funding sources, and to elicit the level of bank interest in various types 
of alternatives. The third section analyzes the profit potential of loans made through 
a MASI type of intermediary and the viability of such an organization for the 
Northeast. This is followed by an analysis of which banks would be able to use FICB 
discounting and the effect of such discounting on bank profits. Finally a summary and 
some conclusions are presented.
NEW YORK BANKS
Any comparison of banking characteristics in New York State with those of other 
states, other regions, or of the nation as a whole, must first acknowledge basic 
differences in the structure of banking due to varying state legislation. As of early 
1984, New York State and 20 other states permit statewide branching by banks. In 17 
states, limited branching is enforced while in 12 states, unit banking is the rule. The 
practice of statewide branching, where allowed, generally has resulted in fewer and 
larger banks than in states with limited branching or unit banking. The Northeast is 
predominated by states with liberal branching laws while in the 12 MASI states!/, 
banks generally operate in a unit banking or limited branching environment.
New York State has proportionally fevyer small banks than either the MASI states 
or the nation as a whole (table 2). To some degree this is due to the preponderance of 
the large New York City banks. Even after eliminating their effect, however, average 
bank size is larger in New York State.
In New York State, the larger banks with more than $200 million in deposits hold 
a majority of the total dollar volume of agricultural loans (table 3). This is in sharp 
contrast to the nation and to the MASI region where small banks of less than $50 
million in deposits account for the majority of agricultural loan volume. These data 
imply that the funding limitations experienced by the banks in New York State and the 
Northeast may be of a different nature than those experienced in the MASI states due 
to size differences.
One size related factor is that of bank lending limits. Due to their generally 
larger size, New York State banks encounter far fewer situations where loan size is a
constraint for making agricultural loans.
SURVEY OF NEW YORK BANKS SERVING AGRICULTURE
Data for the analysis of bank characteristics and interest in alternate funding 
sources were provided by a mail survey sent to the 91 banks in New York State having 
more than $250,000 of outstanding agricultural loans as of December 1982. Banks in 
New York City were excluded from the study because much of their agricultural
lending efforts are outside of New York State and because their funding concerns are 
atypical of most agriculturally oriented banks on the basis of bank size. Fifty-one
T7 Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
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bankers returned completed surveys resulting in a response rate of 56 percent. 
Additional detailed bank data were obtained through the use of December 1982 Call 
reports which banks file with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on a 
quarterly basis. Clarifications of bankers' survey responses and other additional 
information were obtained through a series of follow-up telephone interviews.
Table 2. SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF BANKS IN NEW YORK,
MASI STATES AND THE U.S.
3anuary 1, 1983
Bank Size 
(deposits)
New York 
with NYCf*/
New York 
non NYC£/»k/ MASI States^/ U.S.
No. % No. % No. ' % No. %:
$0 - $25 million 54 26 54 30 3,630 56 6,939 48
$25 - $50 million 38 19 38 21 1,569 24 3,661 25
$50 - $200 million 59 29 56 31 1,117 17 3,038 21
over $200 million 54 26 31 18 157 3 782 6
TOTAL 205 100 179 100 6,473 100 14,420 100
a/ FDIC insured commercial banks.
b/ Excludes banks headquartered in New York City having overseas offices.
c/ Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
Source: Report of Income and Report of Condition (Call reports), Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, December 1982.
Although the 56 percent response rate on the mail questionnaire is a very 
acceptable rate, a study of possible nonrespondent bias was conducted. Nonrespondent 
banks tended to be slightly smaller and less involved in agriculture, but their responses 
relative to agricultural loan profitability, obstacles to agricultural lending and 
preferred sources of funds were very similar to that o f the respondents. Thus, it 
appears appropriate to generalise the results of this study to the entire New York bank 
population.
Study Bank Characteristics
The 51 responding banks were stratified into groups for the purpose of analyzing 
the funding alternatives in question. The smallest 12 banks of less than $25 million in 
deposits are referred to as the size I banks. A second group of 11 banks having from 
$25 to $50 million in deposits are the size II banks. Fourteen banks having from $50 to 
$200 million in deposits make up the size III banks. The size IV banks are the 14 banks 
having more than $200 million in deposits. The size IV banks exhibit the greatest 
heterogeneity by including banks ranging in size from $219 million to just over $3
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billion in deposits. The degree of bank involvement in agricultural lending is a second 
key consideration in the analysis of funding alternatives. To acknowledge the degree 
of bank involvement? an additional class of the most agriculturally oriented banks was 
created. Banks included in this category are also represented in the size based groups. 
This new category? referred to as the Ag banks, includes 13 banks having agricultural 
loans representing: (1) a minimum of $2.5 million? and (2) a minimum of 10 percent of 
the bank's total loan portfolio. A brief summary of study bank characteristics is 
presented in table 4.
Table 3. DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LOAN
VOLUME BY BANK SIZE 
New York? MASI States and U.S. 
December 31? 1982
Bank Size 
(deposits)
New York 
with NYC
New York
non NYC MASI States U.S.
$0 - $25 million 2.2
-Percent of Ag Loan Volume in Area—  
8.0 29.1 28.1
$25 - $50 million 2.1 7.9 31.2 25.1
$50 - $200 million 7.9 29.9 22.4 22.4
over $200 million 87.8 54.9 7.3 24.4
Source: Report of Income and Condition (Call report)? December 1982.
Agricultural Loan Characteristics
The study banks were asked to approximate the distribution of new and 
refinanced agricultural loans according to loan size. Responses indicate that as bank 
size increased, agricultural loan portfolios were more heavily weighted with larger 
loans. Table 5 presents data for new and refinanced agricultural loans rather than all 
outstanding agricultural loans to better portray the nature of current lending 
practices.
The term of the loan is also an important consideration for both the MASI-like 
and the FICB loan funding alternatives. In both cases,! funding is available for short- 
and intermediate-term agricultural loans with maximum terms of five or seven years. 
The two groups of the smallest banks had a higher percentage of short- and 
intermediate-term loans than did the larger and more agriculturally oriented banks 
(table 6).
Trends in Agricultural Loan Volume
Bankers were asked to estimate the trend in their bank's agricultural loan volume 
over the past five years and to project agricultural loan volume for the coming five 
years. Their responses were summarized in tables 7 and 8. Generally? more large 
banks and agricultural banks had experienced increases in loan volume in the past and 
expected further increases in the future.
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Table 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF BANK GROUPS
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank
Group Banks
Number
of
Branches
Total
Ag
Volume
Average
Deposit
Size
Number 
of Ag 
Borrowers
Loan to 
Deposit 
Ratio
number average $ million $ million total average
I 12 .4 13.5 16.1 646 54.1
II 11 1.7 16.0 35.2 379 54.5
III 14 6.3 98.6 92.4 1,576 63.4
IV 14 41.9 143.4 523.3 729 80.1
Ags/ 13 8.3 177.9 149.8 691 60.4
a/ The ag banks are a subset of the four other groupings.
Sources: December 1982 Call reports; May 1983 bank survey.
Table 5. DISTRIBUTION OF NEW AGRICULTURAL LOANS
BY LOAN SIZE^/
Bank Size of Agricultural Loan
Group $0 - $10,000 $10,000 - $25,000 over $25,000
--------------Percent of Loans in Each Bank Class
I 30.5 35.7 33.8
II 30.1 22.5 47.4
III 13.4 15.7 70.9
IV 11.7 22.7 65.6
Ag 10.4 20.2 69.4
a/ Includes all production agriculture loans with terms of five years or less.
Table 6. DISTRIBUTION OF NEW AGRICULTURAL
LOANS BY TERM
Bank _____  :______Term of Loan (Years)
Group Under 1 1 - 5 6-10 over L
I 45.1
— Percent of Loans in Each Bank Group—  
34.3 6.2 14.4
II 43.3 32.1 7.7 16.9
III 21.4 35.9 7.8 34.9
IV 17.1 44.4 20.2 18.3
Ag 15.5 42.2 16.7 25.6
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Table 7. AGRICULTURAL LOAN VOLUME TREND 1978-83
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Ag Loan Volume Change
Group Increased Constant Decreased
I 33
-----—---- Percent of Banks———
33 33
II 45 9 45
III 71 7 2i
IV 57 29 14
Ag 85 8 8
Table 8 . PROJECTIONS OF AGRICULTURAL LOAN VOLUME 1983-87
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Increase Don't
Group Volume Constant Decrease Know
—- — — ------Percent of Banks—--------------- —
I 42 42 0 16
II 55 9 9 27
m 79 0 7 14
IV 64 21 0 14
Ag 85 7 7 0
The term structure of agricultural loans made by banks is, however, expected to 
change. In the next five years more banks plan to increase their nonreal estate loan 
volume than plan to increase their generally longer term real estate volume (table 9). 
This is true for agricultural banks as well as all banks.
The banks’ assessment of the term of funds needed to expand agricultural loan 
volume was consistent with plans to increase nonreal estate loan volume (table 10).
One to five year funds were viewed as the most pressing need. Only the size III and 
the agricultural banks indicated a need for longer term funds. These banks indicated 
that other than one to five year funds, 11 to 20 year funds were most needed.
Obstacles to Ag Lending
To determine the relative priority of the issue of loan funding, the following list 
of potential obstacles to agricultural lending was developed and respondents were
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asked to rank the importance of each obstacle for the past five years and for the 
coaling five years.
(A) Other loans more profitable
(B) Insufficient demand for agricultural loans
(C) Competition from PCAs and FLBAs
(D) Competition from other commercial banks
(E) Competition from other lenders
(F) Bank policy to limit agricultural loan volume
(G) Limited agriculture in bank’s area
(H) Insufficient funds to support agricultural loans
Table 9. PLANNED CHANGE IN REAL ESTATE AND
NONREAL ESTATE AGRICULTURAL LOAN VOLUME 
IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS 
51 New York Banks? 1983
Planned 
Loan Volume
Change
Real Estate Loans Nonreal Estate Loans
All
Banks
Ag
Banks
All
Banks
Ag
Banks
——- — — Number of Banks— —-------- -—
Increase 18 ■6 31 11
Constant 19 3 11 1
Decrease 5 2 0 0
Don’t Know 9 1 9 0
Table 10. TERM OF FUNDS NEEDED TO EXPAND 
AGRICULTURAL LOAN VOLUME 
51 New York Banks, 1983
Loan Bank Group
Term I II III IV All Ag
**—**——— —----Average Ranking**/- —-— ■— --
less than 1 year 2 2 5 3 3
1 -5  years i I i 1 1 1
6 -10 years 3 3 3 2 2 3
11-20 years if 4 2 4 4 2
over 20 years 5 5 ■k 5 5 5
a/ 1 = most needed; 5 - least heeded.
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As seen from table 11, loan fund availability was not a highly ranked concern. 
The obstacle of insufficient funds was rated as being among the top three concerns 
only for the coming five years, and then only by the group III and ag banks (table 12). 
Of far greater concern to bankers in the past and for the future is the competition 
encountered from the Farm Credit System (FCS).
When asked specifically about long-term lending, which they expect to decrease 
in relative importance, the most frequently mentioned obstacle was uncertainty about 
the long-run cash flow generating ability of farms (table 13). The uncertainty appears 
to be of two types: ( 1) uncertainty about the profitability of agriculture, and (2)
uncertainty about the ability of banks and farmers to estimate future cash flows.
Table 11. CURRENT OBSTACLES TO AGRICULTURAL LENDING
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Group
Obstacle I II III IV All Ag
—------- ■Average Ranking^/—
A. Loan Profitability 7 if 5 2 5 6
B. Low Demand 1 1 3 3 2 if
C. FCS Competition 2 2 1 1 1 1
D. Bank Competition 6 5 4 6 6 3
E. Other Competition 3 6 2 if if 2k/
F. Bank Policy 4 ik i 8 7 7 7b/
G. Limited Ag 5 3 6 5 3 7b/
H. Lack of Funds 8 7b/ 7 8 8 5
a/ 1 = most important; 8 = least important .
b/ Tie ranking.
Table 12. FUTURE OBSTACLES TO AG LENDING
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Group
Obstacle I II Ill IV All Ag
Average Rank in g^ ;/—
A. Low Profitability 5 ^b/ ifb/ 2 if 5
B. Low Demand 1 2 2 if 2 if
C. FCS Competition 2 1 1 , 1 1
D. Bank Competition 6 6 7b/ 5 6
E. Other Competition if 8 6 7 5 3
F. Bank Policy 7 7 7b/ 6 8 8
G. Limited Ag 3 3 4b/ 3 3 5b/
H. Lack of Funds 8 4b/ 3 8 7 2
a/ 1 = most important; 8 = least important.
b/ Tie ranking.
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Table 13. OBSTACLES TO LONG-TERM LENDING BY BANKS
51 New York Banks, 1983
Obstacle
Number of Banks 
Mentioning^/
Farm cash flow uncertainty 13
None (no significant obstacles) 11
Lower rates from competition 11
Inability to obtain funds 7
Bank reluctance or policy against long-term 7
Farmer reluctance to borrower long-term 4
Collateral uncertainty 3
Lack of variable rate 2
a/ Each bank could list more than one obstacle.
Lack of funds is an important, though not the most important obstacle to long­
term lending. However, bank policy to limit long-term lending may also reflect a 
concern about mismatching the long terms of loans with the generally shorter terms of 
the bank liabilities incurred to provide loanable funds. Clearly, the low rates offered 
by competing lenders, particularly the Federal Land Banks, limit longer term bank 
lending and indirectly imply the need for lower cost long-term funds. However, the 
shift away from long-term loans raises questions about the ability of banks to increase 
nonreal estate lending when the strongest competition in long-term lending, the Farm 
Credit Service, offers both long- and short-term credit.
The Farm Credit System was clearly ranked as the banks' most important source 
of competition (table 14). Depending on bank size and level of agricultural 
involvement the second most important competitor was either the FmHA or other 
banks. Although by design the FmHA should not compete with other lenders, many 
bankers clearly believe FmHA provides important competition.
Table 14. RANKING OF COMPETITION PROVIDED
BY OTHER LENDERS 
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Group
Competitor I II III IV All Ag
PC As and FLBAs 1 1
-Average Ranking^/- 
1 1 1 1
Other Banks 4 3 2 3 3 2
FmHA 2 2 3 2 2 3
Dealers 3 4 4 4 4 4
Insurance Companys 5 5 5 5 5 5
a/ 1 = most important competition; 5 = least important competition.
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The primary characteristic o f the competition that makes it difficult for banks 
to increase their loan volume is the low interest rates they charge (table 15). All bank 
groups ranked lower interest rates as the most important reason farmers go to other 
lenders. The longer repayment terms that the Farm Credit Service and the FmHA 
offer is also important.
One interpretation of these findings is that for a loan funding alternative to 
foster improved competition from banks for agricultural loans, it is not sufficient for 
it to simply provide funds, it must do so while permitting banks to compete on an 
interest rate basis.
Interest Rates
The interest rates charged by the sample banks for seasonal loans and for short- 
and intermediate-term loans of one to five years are presented in table 16. The 
average rate charged on seasonal loans decreases as bank size increases. A similar, 
but not as clear, trend was also present for production loans.
Table 15. WHY FARMERS ARE ATTRACTED TO BANK COMPETITORS
51 New York Banks, 1983
Competitor Bank Group
Characteristics I II III IV All Ag
— ——----- —-Average Ranking^/——
Lower interest rate 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length of term 
Availability of
3 3 2 2 2 2
long-term loans 
Sizes of loans
4 4 4 3 3 3
accepted
Lender knowledge
2 2 5 5 4 4
of ag
Other ag services
5 6 3 4 5 5
provided 6 5 6 6 6 6
a/ 1 - most important characteristic; 6 = least important characteristic.
Survey results also showed that variable interest rates were widely used by the 
larger banks (groups III and IV) and were used very little by the size I and II banks 
(table 17). The sharp division in the use of variable interest rates between banks of
different size may explain the generally higher interest rates charged by smaller 
banks. The smaller banks may find it necessary to charge a higher rate embodying a 
risk premium for the possibility of subsequent cost of funds increases.
The average New York State PCA interest rate for May 1983, adjusted for stock 
purchase requirements, was 12.6 percent. This is only slightly lower than the rates 
charged by the two largest as well as the agricultural bank groups. The unadjusted
Page 12
average PCA rate, which excludes the effect of the stock purchase requirement, was
11.5 percent in May 1983 which gives the impression of an even larger advantage for 
PCA rates.
Table 16. AVERAGE AGRICULTURAL LOAN
INTEREST RATES BY LOAN TERM
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank
Group
Seasonal Loan 
(less than 1 year)
Production Loan
( 1 - 5  years)
_ _ _ _ _ _ -— percent---------- ----
I 14.14 14.50
11 13.80 13.75
III 12.64 12.82
IV 12.30 13.13
Ag 12.92 12.80
Table 17. USE OF VARIABLE INTEREST RATES ON 
NEW AGRICULTURAL LOANS 
51 New York Farms, 1983
Percent of New Ag Loans with Variable Rates
Group 0 - 25 25 - 50 50 - 75 75 - 100
I 12 0 0 0
II 10 0 0 1
III 2 0 5 7
IV 1 1 2 10
Ag 3 0 0 10
Agricultural Loan Profitability
To compete with lenders such as PCAs, banks might need to offer lower interest 
rates on agricultural loans than charged on other loans. This could cause agricultural 
loans to be less profitable than nonagricultural loans. However, at study banks 
agricultural loans were generally perceived to be on par with other loans with respect 
to profitability. The few banks which cited lower ^-agricultural loan profitability 
attributed this to competition from other lenders which forced agricultural loan rates 
down.
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Sources of Funds
Bankers were asked to indicate the funding techniques they would use in the 
event bank liquidity were limited. The list of funding sources is presented in table 18 
with the bankers’ ratings of the choices. Only the top three choices were rated. The 
overwhelming choice of funding techniques for periods of illiquidity for all but the 
largest banks was the use of loan participations with other banks. The largest banks 
chose the use of large negotiable certificates of deposit (CD) as the most preferred 
funding device.
Cost of Funds
An important component of the interest rate charged to the borrower is the 
lender’s cost of funds. The study banks were requested to estimate their average cost 
of loanable funds for May 1983. According to bankers' estimates, the smallest banks 
(group 1) had an average cost of funds substantially higher than any of the other bank 
groups (table 19).
Table 18. LOAN FUNDING METHODS USED UNDER ILLIQUIDITY
51 New York Banks, 1983
Competitor
Large CDs (over $100,000) 
Participations other banks 
Participations correspondent 
Participation PCAs 
Discount with FICB 
Federal Reserve borrowing 
Federal funds 
Sell FmHA or SBA loansk/ 
Sell Mortgage Loans
II
Bank Group
III IV All Ag
— -Average Ranking^-----
6 5 5c / 1 3 8£ /
1 1 1 , 4 1 1
tf 2 5£/ 5 5 4
5 69.1 7 8 7 8£ /
7£/' 9 2 9 9 3
2£/ 69 / 9 3 4 7 f
2SJ 8 3c/ 2 2 59!
7SJ 3 c/ 3£/ 6 6 2
7S l 3c/ 8 7 8 59/
a/ 1 = highest ranking; 8 = lowest ranking, 
b/ Loans guaranteed by FmHA or SBA.
c l  Tie ranking.
When questioned about their relatively high cost of funds, some group I bankers 
stated that they really had no firm idea of their actual cost of funds while others 
attributed their high cost estimates to holding a large volume of "old" CDs and other 
time deposits made during earlier periods of high interest rates. When examined using 
Call report data, this claim was not substantiated and further analysis suggested that 
the cost of funds for the group I banks was in fact lower than for the other groups.
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Interest in Developing Alternative Sources of Funds
Sixty percent of the banks indicated that identifying alternative sources of funds 
was either currently important for their bank or would be in the near future (table 20). 
Many of the larger banks had access to money markets that would enable them to 
obtain the funds required for any loan they wanted to make.
Table 19. AVERAGE COST OF LOANABLE FUNDS
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank
Group
Survey Responses
Call Report 
Average Cost 
for 1982a/
Number of 
Respondents
Average 
Cost of 
Funds
Range of 
Cost of 
Group
— _— Percent--
I 11 9.8 8.0 - 12.0 6.65
II 9 8.3 6.5 - 9.8 7.30
III 13 8.3 6.6 - 11.0 7.22
IV 11 8.3 6.5 - 10,0 6.72
Ag 13 8.4 6.9 - 11.5 7.17
a/ Calculated from 1982 Call report data as all interest expense divided by the sum
of all liabilities and subordinated notes.
Table 20. IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYING ALTERNATIVE 
SOURCES OF FUNDS 
51 New York Banks, 1983
Level of Percent of
Importance Respondents
Important 34
Not important now, will be later 26
Not important 29
Neutral or nonresponsive 11
To gauge the potential interest among bankers in using either of the loan funding 
programs, the survey included a short description of the mechanics of each of the two 
programs. Based on this admittedly limited information, bankers were asked if they 
would use the two loan funding programs given the chance. The most prevalent 
response was '’maybe1 (tables 21 and 22). This likely resulted in part from the lack of
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detailed information on exactly how the programs would work. In general, larger 
banks and agricultural banks indicated the greatest interest in the MASI program. 
Only group III banks which were also agricultural banks indicated an interest in FICB 
funding. Small banks indicated that they would be unlikely to use either alternative.
Table 21. BANKERS' INTEREST IN USING MAS! PROGRAM
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Would Banks Use MASI Funding
Group Yes Maybe No
I 0 44 56
II 0 64 36
III 35 35 29
IV 21 50 29
Ag 31 54 8
Table 22. BANKERS' INTEREST IN USING FICB PROGRAM 
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank Would Banks Use FICB Funding
Group Yes Maybe No
. I 0 19 81
II 0 73 17
III 29 50 21
IV 0 57 43
Ag 23 54 23
A MASI-LIKE AGRICULTURAL LOAN FUNDING PROGRAM
The MASI program, per se, is not currently available in the eastern part of the 
United States, but the program, or a similar program, could be made available either:
(1) by development of a similar agricultural loan funding corporation for the Northeast 
or for some other group of eastern states, or (2) by expanding coverage of the existing 
MASI program to include New York State. The following analysis is based on the 
procedures and the funding sources currently utilized by MASI. The viability of a 
MASI-like agricultural loan funding corporation is assessed by evaluating the 
feasibility of such a funding program from the point of view of individual participating 
banks and the viability of a MASI-like loan funding corporation itself.
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Characteristics of MAS!
MASI is a multi-bank agricultural credit corporation, incorporated on 
May 4, 1982 as a wholly owned subsidiary of MABSCO Bankers Service Company, 
Incorporated. MASI serves as an intermediary through which member banks can sell 
portions of farm loans to a funding source in the financial markets. The name 
MABSCO was originally to be an acronym for Mid-American Banking Services 
Company. MABSCO was enjoined by court action from using that name because of a 
proprietary interest in it by an Illinois firm. Therefore, the name MABSCO is free 
standing and is not represented as an acronym. MABSCO is owned by the bankers' 
association of 12 mid-western and western states; Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and 
Wisconsin. Its formation followed numerous regional banking conferences at which 
representatives of banks from these states realized the potential for cooperative 
action in addressing common banking problems.
Funding Source: Rabobank
Once the state bankers' associations reached the decision to proceed with the 
MASI concept, domestic as well as foreign money center banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, and the Farm Credit System (FCS) were approached to serve as a 
funding source. The FCS determined that an organization such as MASI, with the 
potential membership of some 6,000 banks, would itself have adequate access to 
regional or national financial markets and therefore declined to serve as a funding 
source.
Rabobank Nederland was approached, expressed interest in the proposal and 
after much research and negotiation, entered into a contractual agreement with the 
MASI organization. Under the original contract, Rabobank committed itself to three 
years of support for the program, after which, appraisal of its progress would 
determine future participation. The agreement between Rabobank and MASI has since 
been extended.
Rabobank is a large bank of over $35 billion of assets which began as a 
cooperative banking institution for the purpose of financing agricultural production in 
the Nederlands. It has retained its cooperative status and has become a general 
commercial bank which finances approximately 90 percent of Dutch agriculture. As a 
large international bank with high quality ratings from both Standard and Poor's and 
Moody's, Rabobank has the capacity to draw on a wide range of both domestic and 
foreign funding sources. Rabobank's funding strategy is to match the amounts and 
tenor of the liabilities it incurs to generate funding for the MASI program to the tenor 
and amount of the assets it acquires from MASI.
The Mechanics of MASI
The Capital Note
MASI is funded by the initial contributions from participating banks in the form 
of a capital note. The amount of the capital note ranges from $5,000 to $14,750 and is 
determined by the size of the bank measured by its total deposits as reported in its
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most recent Call report (see Appendix A). The return on the capital note starts at a 
rate of zero percent in the first year and increases by two percent per year thereafter 
up to the lesser of 10 percent or the national prime interest rate. To comply with 
securities' laws, the amount of capital raised in this manner is not expected to exceed 
$5 million. The capital notes are subordinated liabilities which implies that in the 
event of MASI insolvency, the investing banks’ interest would be honored only after the 
claims of Rabobank.
Master Participation Agreements
The Master Participation Agreement between the local bank and Rabobank 
establishes the terms and conditions under which the sales of agricultural loans are 
made. These conditions include standards for loan quality, loan documentation, loan 
collateral, as well as procedures for establishment of interest rates on, and repayment 
terms for the purchased loans. The agreement also establishes the MASI organization 
as Rabobank's agent. The local bank agrees to service the entire loan, to remit 
payment to Rabobank on a timely basis and to repurchase the loan in the event it was 
misrepresented at the time of sale. Rabobank further makes the commitment not to 
compete for the borrower's future loan business during the period of the agreement.
The Loans
Loans which are eligible for the MASI program are agricultural production loans 
as well as agribusiness loans having a maximum term of five years. Maturities for 
cattle breeding and dairy farm loans can be as long as eight years. The loans need not 
be new loans, as seasoned agricultural loans can also be sold to Rabobank. The 
minimum loan size purchase is $25,000. Rabobank has given MASI the authority to 
purchase, on its behalf, any qualified agricultural loan up to $250,000 in size. Loans 
larger than $250,000 or for longer than standard maturities must be approved by 
Rabobank.
Rabobank has established specifications for the size and terms of loans accepted 
according to loan purpose. An example of these specifications is that loans for used 
farm equipment cannot exceed 50 percent of either the purchase price or the market 
value and carry a maximum term of three years. Examples of similar constraints are 
presented in Appendix B.
In addition to the general loan criteria, Rabobank has also established a loan 
scoring matrix to measure loan quality. The matrix consists of five financial ratios 
calculated from the borrower's balance sheets of the three previous years. The five 
ratios are: ( 1) the borrower's current assets over current liabilities, (2) intermediate 
( 1-7 years) assets over intermediate liabilities, (3) total liabilities over net worth, (^) 
rate of net worth gain, and (5) loan amount over value of security. A weighted score 
of the five ratios is calculated and, if it falls within the acceptable range, the loan 
purchase can automatically be effectuated by MASI for Rabobank, provided it meets 
the previously mentioned size and purpose guidelines. If the loan's quality score is not 
within the acceptable range, the originating bank can request that Rabobank consider 
the loan on other merits. The loan scoring matrix is presented in Appendix C.
The Loan Purchase
When a member bank wants to sell a loan, it first informs MASI of its intentions 
by providing the necessary loan and farm business financial information (Appendix D)
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for the borrower. This process can be accelerated by providing the information over 
the phone and later mailing the participation form. If the loan is judged to be 
acceptable, MASI can accept the purchase on behalf of Rabobank and within the same 
business day or by early the following day, transfer the funds to the originating bank. 
The selling bank must acknowledge receipt of the funds and must provide further loan 
documentation to MASI.
Loan participations are purchased by Rabobank on a last in first out basis (LIFO). 
This means that a borrower's loan repayments are directed first to reimburse 
Rabobank's portion of the loan and only secondly to amortize the portion of the loan 
retained by the originating bank. Loan participations are sold on a nonrecourse basis, 
meaning that Rabobank cannot cause the originating bank to repurchase the loan in the 
event of loan default. The sole exception to this is if the loan had originally been 
misrepresented. Losses from a loan default are shared between the local bank and 
Rabobank in proportion to their loan exposure. The originating bank may repurchase 
the loan from Rabobank at the end of a participation rate period even if the loan has 
not matured. Such a repurchase might be desirable in the event a bank's liquidity 
position improves.
To mitigate Rabobank's credit risk, a loan loss reserve was established to 
reimburse Rabobank for the difference between its losses under LIFO versus the pro­
rate loss sharing. The reserve is administered by MASI and is financed by a one- 
quarter percent markup of the interest rate charged to the banks.
Interest Rates
In the MASI program, Rabobank incurs various forms of liabilities to fund its 
acquisition of agricultural loan participations. The interest rate, which it demands on 
the asset it acquires, is a function of the cost of its liabilities plus a one percent fixed 
margin for its services and profit. When a local bank's loan participation request 
meets Rabobank's criteria, the local bank must select an interest rate participation 
period varying from one to 12 months offered by Rabobank. The three rate periods are 
shown in table 23 with the relevant rates for January 1983. Once the local bank has 
chosen a period, the interest rate it pays to Rabobank is fixed for the duration of the 
period. If the loan has a longer term than the participation period, the interest rate is 
readjusted to reflect the new cost of funds at the end of the original participation 
period. Interest is paid to Rabobank upon the expiration of a participation period and 
the principal amount is paid upon maturity of the loan. The originating bank, however, 
is free to collect interest and principal payments from the borrower as it deems 
appropriate.
The interest rates charged in the MASI program embody several components:
( 1) Rabobank's cost of funds, (2) Rabobank's service fee of one percent, (3) MASI's 
service fee of one-quarter percent, and (4) loan loss reserve of one-quarter percent. 
Rabobank calculates its cost of funds based on the rates for term Federal Funds and on 
dealers' bids for Rabobank's CDs. The components used in the determination of the 
MASI participation rate periods are shown in table 24 with the rates effective for 
January 13, 1983.
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Table 23. MAS! INTEREST RATES BY PERIOD OF PARTICIPATION
January 31, 1983
Participation Period Interest Rate
—percent—
Short term (1 month) 10.54
Medium term ( 1 - 6  months) 10.59
Long term (6 - 12 months) 10.91
Table 24. COMPONENTS OF MASI INTEREST RATE
Funding Source Abbreviation Interest Rate
Term Federal Funds:
30 days ff30
—Percent—
8.9
60 days f f 6G 8.9
90 days ff90 8.9
180 days f f  180 9.0
Rabobank CDs:
180 days cd!80 8.85
360 days cd360 9.40
The exact formulas for computing the MA5I participation rates with an example 
for January 13, 1983 are presented below. The 1.5 in each equation is the sum of the 
surcharges for Rabobank, MAS!, and the loan loss reserve.
Short Term
(1.5) + f f 30 x 365/360 = rate
1.5 + 8.9 x 365/360 = 10.54
Medium Term
1.5 + .2(ff60) + .4(ff90) + .4(ff 180) x 365/360 = rate
1.5 + .2(8.9) + .4(8.9) + .4(9.025) x 365/360 = 10.59
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Long Term
1.5 + .25(cdl80) + .75(cd360) x 365/360 = rate
1.5 + .25(8.85) + .75(9.40) x 365/360 - 10.91
The local bank is free to charge whatever interest rate it desires on the entire 
loan while paying Rabobank the stated participation rate. This differential can result 
in a multiplication effect on the bank’s yield for the portion of the loan which it keeps. 
For example, if a bank charged a borrower 13 percent for a $100,000 agricultural loan 
and then sold 80 percent of the loan to Rabobank at a cost of 11 percent, the return on 
the $20,000 investment would be substantially higher than the original 13 percent.
Interest Received $100,000 x .13 = $ 13,000
Interest Paid Rabobank $ 80,000 x . 11 = 8,800
Net Received - $ 4,200
Effective Return $4,200/$20,00Q = 21%
The above calculation of the return on investment can be deceptive as it assumes 
that the funds obtained as the proceeds of the loan sale can be reinvested at 
approximately the same return as the original agricultural loan. The e ffect of this 
assumption and an alternative measure of profitability is examined in the following 
analysis.
Profitability of Loans Made Through a MASI-Like Organization
The goal of the following analysis is to determine whether the development of a 
funding source similar to the existing MASI program could be beneficial to agricultural 
finance markets of New York State and the Northeast. Based on the bankers’ survey 
responses, it was observed that improved competition among agricultural lenders could 
be fostered by lowering interest rates on bank-made agricultural loans while 
maintaining agricultural loan profitability at approximately existing levels. In the 
analysis, profitability of the MASI program is compared to the profitability of existing 
funding alternatives. If the MASI program is found to be more profitable than existing 
techniques, it is assumed that the interest rates charged by banks on agricultural loans 
could be lowered. If, however, the MASI program is found to be inferior to existing 
techniques in terms of profitability, it would need to offer other advantages to 
warrant further consideration. The profitability comparisons are developed first for 
conditions in which banks are generally liquid and secondly for conditions in which 
banks are generally illiquid and therefore in need of funds.
The frequency of illiquidity is estimated using commercial bank survey data from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Agricultural bankers were asked if they felt 
their bank’s loan to deposit ratio was either too high, too low, or at a desirable level. 
For this study, illiquidity is designated to occur when the percentage of surveyed 7th 
District bankers stating that loan to deposit ratios are too high, is larger than the 
percentage of those bankers stating that loan to deposit ratios are too low. Using this 
definition, approximately 30 percent of the 10 year period from 1974 to 1983 could be 
considered to have been illiquid. This period of illiquidity ran from the third quarter 
of 1977 through the third quarter of 1980.
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Using MASI Under Conditions of Liquidity
Conditions of liquidity are defined here to mean that banks are able to grant all 
additional loan requests using "in-house" funds rather than needing to attract 
additional funds. In this case, the MASI program is compared only against the use of 
"in-house" funds. Equations 1 and 2 represent the net cash flows of using MASI and 
"in-house" funds, respectively.
Equation 1; Net Cash Flow (NCF) Using a MASI-like Program Under 
Conditions of Liquidity
NCF = iX + a(PX) - b(X) - m(PX) - sX - d(l-P)X
Equation 2% NCF Using Only Bank's Funds Under Liquidity
NCF = i(X) - b(X) - s(X) - d(X)
Where: i = interest rate on agricultural loans
X = total agricultural loan volume 
a = return on alternative investments 
P = percent of loan sold via MASI
b = bank’s average cost of funds 
m = cost of MASI funds
s = loan servicing cost (per dollar of loan volume) 
d = loan loss rate
The return on alternative investments (a) represents the return that could be 
earned by investing the funds that would be generated by the sale of a loan to a MASI- 
like funding program. Under the conditions of bank liquidity it is assumed that the 
most profitable use of the loan sale proceeds would be in the U.S. securities or Federal 
fund markets.
By setting equations 1 and 2 equal to each other and solving for the alternative 
investment rate (a), a break-even point for the return on alternative investments 
relative to the cost of the MASI funds can be determined. These calculations are 
facilitated by the number of terms which occur on both sides of the equality and 
therefore cancel each other out as shown on page 23.
Equation 1 = Equation 2
iX + aPX - bX - mPX - cX - dX(l-P) = iX - bX - cX - dX 
aPX - mPX - dX(l-P) = -dX 
aPX - mPX + dX(P-i + 1) = 0 
aPX - mPX + dPX = 0 
PX (a - m + d) =0 
a - m + d =0
a = m - d
The results indicate that a bank's cost of funds, per se, does not affect the 
decision to participate in a MASI-like funding program. The return available on the
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additional funds relative to their cost is more important in a bank's decision. If the 
return on alternative investments (a) is equal to or greater than the cost of MASI-like 
funds minus the loan loss rate, the MASI-like alternative has equal or greater 
profitability than the option of not making the additional loan or investment. Federal 
funds and certificates of deposit are likely investment alternatives for many banks. A 
somewhat higher yielding investment alternative that banks might use is Treasury 
notes. However, average Treasury note yields over the 1974-83 period was 10.18 
percent. The estimated MAS! rate for the same period was 11.72 percent. With 
normal loan loss rates, sale of loans to MASI would remain unprofitable. In this case, 
the cost of MASI-like funds would always be higher than the Federal funds rate since 
the MASI rate is calculated using the Federal funds and CD rates plus a markup of 1.5 
percentage points. This relationship holds regardless of the individual bank's actual 
cost of funds, its interest rate charged, or the share of the original loan sold to the 
funding program. The role of the loan loss variable is important because by selling a 
portion of a loan to the MASI-like program, the loan loss exposure of the originating 
bank is lessened due to the nonrecourse nature of the loan sale.
These findings imply that under conditions of bank liquidity the MASI system 
would not be used by banks given normal investment alternatives. Therefore, It would 
not improve banks' competitive position vis-a-vis the Farm Credit System.
MASI Under Conditions o f Illiquidity
The scenario of illiquidity portrays the case in which banks are able to make 
additional loans only by using outside sources of funds. Use of MASI funds is first 
compared against the use of loan participations and then against the use of large 
denomination CDs as funding alternatives* According to survey information, loan 
participations are frequently written so that the participating bank pays the 
originating bank a fee to cover the expense of servicing the loan. Equations 3 and 4 
model the loan investments using the MASI-like program and loan participation 
respectively. The term for the return on alternative investments of equation 1 is 
dropped because the investment opportunities are identical for both the participation 
funds or the MASI funds.
Equation 3; MASI Funding with Illiquidity
NCF = iX - bB - mPX - sX - d(l-P)X 
Equation 4: Participation Funding with Illiquidity
NCF = iX - bB - yPX - sX - dU-P)X
Where: y = cost of participation funds (y = i - s)
B = volume of bank's funds used, B = l-P (X )
By setting the two equations equal to each other, it can be determined that a 
break-even point for usage of the MASI-like program occurs when the cost of MASI 
funds is equal to the cost of funds obtained from a participation loan.
Equation 3 = Equation 4
iX - bB - mPX - sX - d (l-P)X  = iX - bB - yPX - sX - d(l-P)X
m= y
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This result suggests that if the MASI participation rate is lower than the cost of 
participation funds (which is effectively the interest rate charged on the loan minus 
servicing costs), it would be more profitable to sell the loan through a MASI-like 
intermediary than to participate the loan. Using agricultural loan interest rate data 
and estimates of MASI rates for the period of illiquidity which ran from the third 
quarter of 1977 to the third quarter of 1980, it can be seen that, on the average, the 
MASI funds were A  percent more costly than participation funds (table 25). For banks 
which could obtain loanable funds through the use of loan participations, these results 
indicate that a MASI-like program would not improve their competitive position 
relative to other agricultural lenders.
Using CDs During Illiquidity
The largest banks, size IV, indicated that in the event of illiquidity they would 
issue CDs to secure loanable funds. This funding method is compared with the MASI 
funding option. Equation 5 models the investment decision using CDs and is identical 
to equations 3 and 4 with the exception that there is no loan loss sharing since the 
bank retains the entire loan volume.
Equation 5; Certificate of Deposit Funding with Illiquidity
NCF = i(X) - b(B) - z(Z) - s(X) - d(X)
Where; z  -  cost of CDs
Z  = volume of CDs (Z = PX)
By setting equation 3, which represents use of the MASI program, equal to 
equation 5, which represents the use of CDs the break-even point for the cost of CDs 
can be calculated. The break-even point represents the maximum that a bank could 
afford to pay for funds obtained via CDs and break-even relative to the usage of a 
MASI-like program.
Equation 3 = Equation 5
iX - bB - mPX - sX - dX(l-P) 
-mPX - dX(l-P) 
-mP - d(l-P) 
-mP - d (l-P ) + d 
-mP - d (l-P -l) 
-mP + dP 
m
iX - bB - zZ - sX - dX 
-zPX - dX 
-zP - d 
-zP 
-zP 
-zP 
z + d
The results indicate that a MASI-like program would be more profitable than use 
of CDs when the MASI-like program rate is below the cost of CDs plus the loan loss 
rate. The break-even points were calculated using MASI rates relevant to the period 
of illiquidity and were compared to the adjusted cost of CDs over the same period. 
Table 26 presents the break-even costs for the size IV banks, the effective CD costs, 
and their spread during the period of illiquidity.
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Table 25. MASI VERSUS PARTICIPATION COSTS
DURING ILLIQUIDITY
Year Quarter
Participation
Cost!*/
MASI
Cost^/
Advantage 
of MASI
1977 III 7 = 4 7.6 -.2
IV 8.1 8.3 -.2
1978 I 8.3 8.6 -.3
II 8.6 9.2 -. 6
III 9.4 10.0 -.9
IV 10.7 11.6 - . 6
1979 I 11.5 12.1 -.6
II 11.8 12.2 -.4
III 11.9 12.9 - 1.0
IV 15.2 15.8 -.6
1980 I 15.0 17.3 -2.3
II 17.5 14.8 2.7
Average
III 11.8 11.8 0.0
-0.4
a/ Participation costs are estimated at average rate charged by large banks on
nonreal estate farm loans (as reported in A$jricultural Finance Databook, Board
servicing fee.
b/ MAS! rates are estimated using the overnight Federal Funds rate as the one 
month MAS! rate. The one-to-six month MASI rate is calculated as the one 
month rate multiplied by the historical spread between MASI's one month and 
one-to-six month rate (1=04). This may slightly underestimate MASI's rate due to 
difference between overnight Federal Funds rate and term Federal Fund rates.
To attract funds through CDs, smaller banks would normally need to pay a 
premium over the rate paid by the large New York City banks for CDs. Precise 
information on the size of the CD premium during periods of illiquidity are not 
available. These findings show that during previous periods of illiquidity, the average 
quoted cost of CD funds was .6 of a percentage point lower than the cost of MASI 
funds. This means that a bank should opt for CDs rather than a MASI-like program for 
obtaining loanable funds if it is able to issue CDs during a period of general bank 
illiquidity while paying an interest rate premium of less than .6 percent over the 
quoted rates offered by the largest banks.
Feasibility of a MASI-Like Organization
In order to make funding of the type that MASI provides available to bankers in 
New York or the Northeast, an agricultural loan funding corporation similar to MASI 
must be established or the services of the existing MASI extended to cover the
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additional area. The viability o f such an organization was assessed by examining the 
feasibility of developing an independent funding intermediary for the Northeast in the 
mold of the MASI program.
3im Potter, Executive Vice President of MASI, estimated MASI's operating 
expenses to be roughly $18,000 per month. Based on a markup of the rates charged to 
the member banks of one-quarter percent, it can be calculated that over $85 million of 
agricultural loans would need to be channeled through the intermediary for it to cover 
its expenses ($18,000 x 12/.0025 - $86.4 million).
Table 26. ADVANTAGE OF MASI OVER CD FUNDING OF LOANS
DURING ILLIQUID PERIODS
Year Quarter
MASI
Costa/
Break-Even 
CD Cost^/
Advantage 
of MASI
1977 III 7.6 7.0 -. 6
IV 8.3 7.9 -.4
1978 I 8.6 8.1 -.5
II 9.2 8.7 -.5
III 10.0 9.5 -.5
IV 11.6 11.7 .1
1979 I 12.1 11.7 -.4
II 12.2 11.5 -.7
III 12.9 12.3 -.6
IV 15.8 15.2 -.6
1980 I 17.3 11.7 -.6
II 14.8 12.9 -1.9
Average
HI 11.8 11.3 -.5
-.60
a7 MASI rates are estimated using the overnight Federal Funds rate as the one
month MASI rate. The one-to-six month MASI rate is calculated as the one 
month rate multiplied by the historical spread between MASI's one month and 
one-to-six month rate (1.04), This may slightly underestimate MASI's rate due to 
difference between overnight Federal Funds rate and term Federal Fund rates.
b/ Average of offering rate quoted by five dealers; annualized (x 365/360) and 
adjusted for reserve requirements of three percent CD quoted rate x 365/360
1.0-.03
plus 0.9 percent loan loss. Loan loss rate of 0.9 percent is the average of all size 
IV banks loss rates for all types of loans. Loss rates specifically for agricultural 
loans were not available.
Source; Federal Reserve Annual Statistical Digest.
Four factors influence the proportion of total agricultural loan volume that 
banks are likely to place through a MASI-like agricultural loan funding corporation.
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They include: (1) the proportion of agricultural loans that are larger than $25,000 in 
size and have maturities of five years or less, (2) the percentage of agricultural loans 
that meet the basic loan eligibility criteria (Appendix B), and are judged acceptable by 
the loan scoring matrix (Appendix C), (3) the percentage of eligible loans that would be 
participated to a MASI-like intermediary by the banks making loans, and (4) the 
percent of participated loans that are sold to the MASI-like intermediary (banks can 
choose to sell up to a maximum of SO percent of agricultural loans). Survey data 
showed that roughly 40 percent of the dollar volume of the study banks1 agricultural 
loans would have met the MASI criteria o f being larger than $25,000 and having a 
maximum maturity of five years (table 27). Experience to date of the MASI program 
indicates that banks sell an average of 70 percent of each loan participated through 
MASI. It is assumed that New York or the Northeast would experience a similar rate 
of participation.
The remaining two factors, the percent of loans meeting basic MASI loan 
characteristic criteria and the percent of qualified loans participated by banks are 
difficult to estimate. These two factors are therefore varied over a range while 
holding the other two factors at their estimated levels. The previously calculated 
break-even loan volume for a MASI-like intermediary of $86.4 million is divided by the 
product of the four factors to provide an estimate of the total agricultural loan 
volume needed to support such an intermediary (table 28).
Using bank-made agricultural loan volume data from individual states, the scope 
of state participation needed to support the intermediary can be estimated. In making 
these estimations, the bank volume of agricultural loans used included only those banks 
without foreign branches (table 29). Banks with foreign branches are generally large 
enough to tap the capital markets quite successfully and, thus, were not likely to use a 
MASI-like funding source. Further, the banks included under this classification were 
similar in character to those included in the survey sample. In New York State the 
excluded banks were generally large New York City banks.
Table 27. PERCENTAGE OF LOANS MEETING MASI
SIZE AND TERM CRITERIA 
51 New York Banks, 1983
Bank
Group
Group
Share!*/
Percent 
over $25,000
Percent 
under 5 yrs.
Weighted
Shared'
I .03 .34 .79 .01
II .06 .47 .75 .02
III .36 .71 .57 .15
IV .53 .66 .62 .22
Weighted Sum .40
a/ Percent of total agricultural loan volume for all New York Banks (from
”  December 1982 Call report).
b/ Product of three previous factors.
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Table 28. TOTAL LOAN VOLUME REQUIRED TO SUPPORT
M A SI-LIKE AGRICULTURAL LOAN FUNDING CORPORATION^/
Qualified Loans 
Participated
Percent of Loans Meeting MASI Eligibility Criteria^/
20 40 60 80
10 15.4 7.7 5.1 3.8
20 7.7 3.9 2.5 1.9
30 5.1 3.9 1.7 1.5
40 3.9 1.9 1.3 .9
50 3.1 1.5 1.1 .8
a/ Percent of loans greater than $25,000 and term less than five years assumed to
be 40 percent. Participation level of loans sold assumed to be 70 percent.
b/ Those meeting eiigibilty criteria (appendix table B) and scoring less than 4.0 on 
the loan scoring matrix (appendix table C).
Table 29. VOLUME OF BANK-MADE AGRICULTURAL LOANS BY STATE
December 1982
Volume^/ Cumulative Volume
State (million $) (million $)
New York 370 370
New England 266 636
Pennsylvania 680 1,316
New Jersey 20 1,336
Maryland 121 1,457
Delaware 96 1,553
Ohio 951 2,504
West Virginia 91 2,595
Virginia 315 2,910
Indiana 1,494 4,404
Kentucky 1,019 5,423
North Carolina 317 5,7 40
South Carolina 99 5,839
Tennessee 657 6,496
Mississippi 580 7,076
Alabama 423 7,499
Georgia 600 8,099
Florida 327 8,426
a/ Loans made by banks without foreign branches. 
Source; December 1982 Call reports.
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Under the least optimistic set of assumptions, all states east of the Mississippi 
River not already affiliated with MAS! would need to join such an endeavor for it to 
succeed. Under the most optimistic set of assumptions, all New England states, as 
well as New York State, would be required to support the intermediary. Developing a 
most likely scenario involves considerable judgement and risk. However, the current 
proportion of MASI region qualified loans that are participated is less than 10 percent, 
indicating that participation at the 10 to 20 percent rate is likely as high as could be 
expected. On the other hand, a high proportion of loans made to farmers by 
commercial banks meet the basic loan criteria and would score less than four on the 
loan scoring matrix. Although the general profitability of agriculture will e ffect this, 
it appears likely that at least 60 percent of bank loans would meet the specific 
criteria. Under this most likely situation, New York, New England, Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and Ohio would be the minimum area needed to make such 
an intermediary viable.
Earlier analysis showed that during periods of liquidity little use of the program 
would be made. When this factor is taken into account, the geographical scope of 
participation widens again by a factor of more than three assuming that illiquidity 
occurs 30 percent of the time.
These projections are, as mentioned, only estimates. They nonetheless serve to 
demonstrate the potential scope of acceptance necessary for such an undertaking to be 
economically viable. A new program could alter the general guidelines in a number of 
ways in response to the concerns raised here regarding program viability. The loan 
size and term limitations could be eased to provide a larger pool of eligible loans. The 
participation rate surcharge for its expenses could be increased to provide a wider 
margin. Currently, banks are not obliged to make use of the MASI program. This 
provision could be altered to require a minimum level of annual agricultural loan sales 
to provide the intermediary with a more predictable flow of funds and receipts. Such 
changes, however, might compromise the program's acceptability to both its funding 
sources and its potential member banks.
Joining the Existing MASI
Soon after the MASI program was underway, a group of western state bankers’ 
associations proposed the creation of a MASI-like intermediary to be called WEBSCO. 
This proposal was dropped due to the limited number of banks in the WEBSCO zone. 
Even if 10 to 15 percent of all the banks in the area joined WEBSCO, its total 
membership would still have been less than 100 banks. This total was judged to be 
insufficient to support such an organization. As an alternative, the bankers of Oregon 
and Montana were offered the option of joining MASI provided that a minimum of 10 
banks from each state joined.
Joining MASI, rather than forming another organization, appears to offer the 
greatest promise for those bankers in New York State deciding that the MASI program 
would allow them to better compete for agricultural loans. The choice of joining the 
existing MASI intermediary does not, however, totally eliminate the concern for the 
program's viability. MASI's usage can also be expected to vary as a function of 
liquidity. Further, by early 1984, the volume of loans participated through MASI was 
considerably less than needed for long term survivability. This slow initial 
performance could be due to the current period of liquidity, or simply to bankers' 
unfamiliarity with the proposal. r
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Discounting with the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks
In 1923, Congress established a network of 12 Federal Intermediate Credit Banks 
(FICBs) to discount or purchase agricultural loans from the existing lenders such as 
farmers' cooperatives and commercial banks. This service was designed to provide 
these lenders with a reliable source of loanable funds for short and intermediate term 
agricultural credit needs. Little use was made of the FICB prompting Congress, in 
1933, to create a national system of Production Credit Associations (PCAs) to directly 
serve farm borrowers. The option of discounting agricultural loans to FICBs, however, 
is still available to qualified commercial banks and other lenders.
Discounting can be accomplished by a commercial bank in either of two ways. 
The first is for a bank to directly discount eligible loans with the FICB. The second 
alternative is for a commercial bank to form an agricultural credit corporation (ACC) 
through which loans would be made to farmers and discounted with the FICB.
Only the option of discounting agricultural loans via an ACC is considered here 
because direct discounting does not offer relief from high loan to deposit ratios, nor 
does it provide a "home" for overline loans because the bank itself must guarantee the 
loan. With the second discounting option, however, it is the ACC and not the bank 
that provides the guarantee thereby providing liquidity and overline assistance for the 
bank. The analysis of this funding option focuses first on the requirements banks must 
meet to qualify for the program and secondly on the profitability of using this funding 
alternative.
Bank Eligibility
A bank can qualify for FICB discounting privileges if the following four criteria 
can be met;
( 1) the bank is significantly involved in agricultural or aquatic lending,
(2) the bank can demonstrate continued need for such funding,
(3) the bank is unable to reliably access national or regional capital markets,
(4) the bank will continue to use the same proportion of its own funds to support 
agricultural lending activities.
Specific guidelines for measuring these four factors have been established in each of 
the FCS districts. The guidelines of the Springfield district, under whose jurisdiction 
loan discounting agreements in New York State would fail, are presented here. In 
applying these criteria, the FICB first determines if a bank shouid be considered by 
itself or together with its affiliates or subsidiaries for the purpose of determining 
eligibility. This determination is based on the relationship between the various parties 
with respect to factors such as ownership, common management, common 
directorships, contractual or correspondent relationships, prior business dealings and 
liability interrelationships. A bank which is part of a holding company would be 
eligible for the discounting privilege only if the consolidated entity of the bank and the 
holding company meets all requirements. This effectively restricts access to the 
discounting program to independent banks and to those banks which are members of 
relatively small bank holding companies.
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Lending Involvement
A minimum of 13 percent of the bank’s loan portfolio must be in agricultural or 
aquatic loans at the seasonal peak. This may include loans for agricultural production 
or agricultural real estate as well as agricultural or aquatic leasing obligations. Rural 
housing and agribusiness loans cannot be applied towards the minimum percentage. A 
bank having less than 15 percent of such loans but able to show that such a level will 
be reached in 18 months or less can also be considered.
Continuing Need
To meet the criteria of continuing need, a bank must have a gross loan to deposit 
ratio at its seasonal peak of at least 60 percent for the last three consecutive years. 
If a bank's failure to attain this level is due to general economic decline in its area, 
this requirement may be relaxed. Items such as loans purchased from other banks in 
the form of participations are not included in determining this ratio. The bank must 
also supply a projection of anticipated discounting volume to demonstrate that it will 
make regular use of the discounting agreement rather than using it only when funds 
are unavailable elsewhere.
Lack of Access to Money Markets
This requirement is judged on the basis of whether a bank by itself or in 
conjunction with its holding company has the ability to utilize bankers' acceptances, 
commercial paper, negotiable certificates of deposit, or other similar liability 
instruments as a regular part of its funding mechanism. A bank not using such liability 
management tools but nonetheless having the capacity to regularly do so would not 
meet this requirement.
Continued Agricultural Involvement
The bank is required to maintain a constant or increasing proportion of its 
resources dedicated to agricultural or aquatic lending after entering into a discounting 
agreement with the FICB. To meet the requirement, a bank must be able to increase 
its total agricultural loan volume in order to maintain a constant commitment of its 
own resources to agricultural lending while discounting agricultural loans to the FICB.
Banks Qualifying for Discounting Privileges
Based on survey and Call report data only 26 New York State banks met the first, 
criteria o f having a minimum agricultural loan to total loan ratio of 15 percent. Two 
of the 26 are members of large bank holding companies giving them access to financial 
markets. These two were judged ineligible on the basis of the third requirement of 
lack of access to the money markets. The FICB-Springfield sets a minimum 
discounting volume of $1.5 million. For this analysis it is assumed that for a bank to 
start an ACC, discount the minimum required volume, and not diminish the percentage 
of its own resources dedicated to agricultural lending in compliance with the fourth 
condition, it would need a current agricultural loan volume of at least twice the 
minimum discounting volume or $3 million. Only seven of the 2U- potential discounters 
had agricultural loan volumes larger than $3 million. Loan volume was measured as of 
May 1983 for the 15 survey respondents and as of December 1982 for the nine 
nonrespondents.
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The seven potentially qualifying banks account for a total of $62 million of 
agricultural loans, or roughly 16 percent of ail New York State agricultural loans made 
by non-New York City banks. Six of the seven banks answered a survey questionnaire 
asking if the bank would use the F1CB discounting option if  it were given the option to 
do so. Two answered they would not use it, two were undecided and two stated that 
they would discount agricultural loans with the FICB given the opportunity.
In summary, the extremely limited number of banks eligible for the FICB 
discounting program, in combination with an apparent lack of interest in using the 
program among even those banks qualified to do so indicated, that this funding option 
could at best be a relatively minor contribution to improved competition in 
agricultural credit markets in New York State.
Profitability Analysis
The preceding analysis has highlighted the limited scope of the FICB discounting 
program on an overall basis. Its potential for improving bank competition for those 
few qualified banks depends on the profitability of such discounting to the individual 
banks.
The first factor that must be considered is the impact of the capitalization 
requirement on the cost of funds acquired by an ACC from the FICB. In the 
Springfield FCS district, an ACC is capitalized by purchasing stock certificates from 
the FICB in an amount equal to 10 percent of the anticipated discounting volume. The 
actual cost of funds acquired by an ACC from the FICB must be adjusted to reflect 
the opportunity cost of the noninterest bearing certificates. With a 10 percent 
capitalization requirement this adjustment is accomplished by dividing the contract 
rate by .9 (1.0 -0.1). According to FICB requirements, the discounting program must 
be used on a continuing basis by the ACC. For this reason, the separate profitability 
analyses done under conditions of liquidity and illiquidity must be combined to provide 
an overall assessment.
FICB Discounting Under Liquidity
The analysis of the MASI funding alternative under conditions of liquidity showed 
that the determining factor in the profitability comparison was the return available on 
"nonloan" investments relative to the cost of the funds obtained from the MASI 
program. Equations similar to those used in the MASI analysis are presented to depict 
the net returns on investments made using FICB funds as compared to the option of a 
bank using only its own funds. Equation 7 portrays the use of FICB funds which 
engenders the making of "nonioan" investments in the amount of the FICB funds used. 
These alternative investments are included to maintain consistency with the 
assumption that during periods of liquidity a bank could satisfy all loan demands using 
locally generated funds regardless of their cost. Equation 2 is repeated to represent 
the investment of a bank making agricultural loans using its own funds. By equating 
the two equations, it is shown that if the rate received on alternative investments 
exceeds the cost of FICB funds net profitability is improved.
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Equation 7% FICB Funding Under Liquidity
NCF = iX + aPX - bB - fPX - sX - dX
Where? i = interest rate on agricultural loan 
X = total agricultural loan volume 
a = return on alternative investments 
P - percent of loans sold to FICB 
b - bank's average cost of funds 
B = volume of bank's funds used (B = X) 
f = cost of FICB funds, adjusted for capitalization cost 
s = servicing cost as percent of loan volume 
d = loan loss as percent of loan volume
Equation 2% Bank Lending Using own Funds Under Liquidity
NCF = iX - bB - sX - dX
Equation 7 = Equation 2
iX + aPX - bB - fPX - sX - dX = iX -bB -sX -dX 
aPX - fPX = 0
f = a
Table 30 shows that during periods of liquidity over the past 10 years, the FICB 
funding alternative has been less profitable than the option of making agricultural 
loans using only a bank's own funds. The results obtained are not surprising as it would 
be expected that during periods of liquidity the program would not be needed but 
would instead be "maintained" to comply with program guidelines of continued usage.
Some banks might find other investment vehicles more adaptable for their 
situation. However, other alternatives that are likely to be selected do not make the 
FICB alternatives more attractive. Use of three year Treasury Notes or Federal Funds 
increases the disadvantage of FICB funding to 1.1 and 1.2 percent, respectively.
FICB Discounting, Under Illiquidity
Conditions of illiquidity are assumed to imply that a bank would need to attract 
outside funds to support expanded loan activity. The profitability of the FICB loan 
discounting program is evaluated by comparing the cost of FICB funds to the cost o f 
funds obtained from other funding sources. The use of loan participations was the 
funding alternative most frequently cited by the seven banks potentially qualifying for 
the FICB program.
Equation 4 of the previous section is used here to portray the loan investment 
made using participation funds. This equation assumes that loan default risk is shared 
proportionally between the originating and participating banks. Equation 8 represents 
the agricultural loan investment made using FICB funds under illiquidity. Equation 8 
differs from 7 by eliminating the terms for alternative investments, which are not 
made during periods of illiquidity.
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Table 30. ADVANTAGE OF FICB WHEN RELEASED FUNDS
WOULD BE INVESTED IN CDs DURING PERIODS
OF LIQUIDITY
Year Quarter
CD Investment 
Return!*/
Cost of 
FICB Funds^/
Advantage of 
FICB Funding
1974 I 8.7 9.2 -.5
II 11.1 9.5 1.6
III 12.2 9.8 2.4
IV 9.5 10.1 -.6
1975 I 6.8 10.0 -3.2
II 6.1 9.1 -3.0
III 6.9 8.4 -1.5
IV 6.4 8.4 -2.0
1976 I 5.3 8.2 -2.9
II 5.6 8.1 -2.5
III 5.5 7.7 -2.2
IV 5.0 7.5 -2.5
1977£/ I 4.9 7.3 -2.4
II 5.3 7.2 -1.9
1980 IV 16.0 12.2 3.8
1981 I 16.1 13.8 2.3
II 17.0 14.7 2.3
III 17.7 15.5 2.2
IV 13.7 15.7 -2.0
1982 I 14.4 15.2 -.8
II 14.4 14.9 -.5
III 12.1 14.3 -2.2
IV 9.1 13.0 -3.9
1983 I 8.6 11.4 -2.8
II 8.9 10.8 -1.9
III 9.7 11.2 -1.5
Average - 1.0
a/ Three month CD annualized return rate, Federal Reserve Bank Statistical
Digests 1974-83.
b/ Effective cost of FICB funds adjusted for capitalization requirements, FICB- 
Springfield.
c/ The period from quarter III, 1977 through quarter III 1980 is examined under 
conditions of illiquidity.
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Equation 4; Participation Loans Under Illiquidity
NCF = iX - bB - yPX - sX - dX(l-P)
Where: y = cost of participation funds
B = bank funds used to make loan* B = (l-P )X
Equation 8: F1CB Funding Under Illiquidity 
NCF = iX - bB - fPX - sX - dX
By equating these two equations it is seen that the break-even point occurs when 
the cost of FICB funds is equal to the cost of participation funds minus the loan loss 
percentage. The loan loss percentage is important because in participation loans it 
was assumed that loan losses are shared, while when using FICB funds, a bank must 
absorb the entire loss. The FICB alternative would therefore be profitable relative to 
the option of participating loans when the cost of FICB funds is less than the cost of 
participation funds minus the loan loss rate.
Equation 4 = Equation 8
iX - bB - yPX - sX - dX(l-P) 
-yPX - dX(l-P) 
-yP - d(l-P) + d 
-yP - d (l-P -l) 
-yP - dP 
f
iX - bB - fPX - sX - dX
-fPX - dX
-fP
-fP
-fP
y - d
Table 31 compares the cost of FICB funds to the break-even point which is the 
participation rate minus the loan loss rate. The cost of participation funds was 
obtained from nationwide data representing the interest rates charged on agricultural 
loans by banks having more than $500 million in assets minus a one percentage point 
fee to cover the loan servicing expenses incurred by the originating bank. The loan 
loss rate of .4 percent was the average rate of the seven potentially qualifying banks. 
The option of using FICB funds is shown to be more profitable than the use of 
participation loans under conditions of illiquidity. FICB funds were especially 
attractive relative to participation funds during periods of rising interest rates. This 
is partly attributable to the average cost method used by FIGBs to price their funds to 
PCAs and ACCs. Conversely, it can be seen that when interest rates fall, the average 
cost pricing system of FICBs results in higher rates.
The results of the profitability analysis under liquidity and illiquidity are 
summarized in table 32. Even if a bank were qualified, the profitability of using FICB 
funds was inferior to the use of currently available funding techniques over the 1974 to 
1983 period. While the FICB program was profitable during periods of illiquidity, it 
was not profitable enough to outweigh the losses that resulted during periods of 
liquidity.
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Table 31. FICB VERSUS PARTICIPATION FUNDING DURING ILLIQUIDITY
Year Quarter
Break-Even Rates 
Using Participation^/
Cost of FICB 
Funds.fr/
Advantage 
of FICB
1977 10 7.0 7.2 -.2
IV 7.7 7.8 -.3
1978 I 7.9 7.9 0.0
II 8.2 8.3 -.1
III 9.0 8.5 .5
IV 10.3 9.1 1.2
1979 I 11.1 10.0 1.1
II 11.4 10.4 1.0
III 11.5 10.6 .9
IV 14.8 11.3 3.5
1980 I 14.6 12,3 2.3
II 17.1 12.9 4.2
III 11.4 11.7 -.3
Average 1.1
a/ Participation rate is the average large bank (greater than $500 million in assets)
agricultural loan rate less one percent servicing fee. Break-even rate is the 
participation rate minus .4 percent loss. The average loan loss rate for the seven 
banks potentially qualifying for FICB discounting was .4 percent.
h j  Effective FICB rate including capitalization stock cost.
Source; Federal Reserve Bank Agricultural Finance Databook and FICB-Springfield.
On average over the past 10 years, for each agricultural loan dollar passed 
through an ACC, a loss of .3 percent occurred. These results are, of course, based on 
past trends. Future interest rate movements and liquidity environments will 
undoubtedly differ from past trends. If the frequency or level of FICB dividend 
payments increases in future periods the average profitability of ACCs could improve. 
However, if loan loss rates were higher the profitability of an ACC relative to loan 
participation would decline. For example, if the loan loss rate were 0.9 percent (as 
experienced by large banks, table 26) instead of 0.4 percent, the average ACC loss of 
.3 would increase to .5.
If CD's were viewed as the alternate source of funding, the advantage of FICB 
during illiquid periods would depend upon the amount that an individuals bank's CD 
rate exceeded the large bank CD rate. The break-even rate is determined by equating 
equation 5 and 8 and results in a break-even where the FICB rate equals the CD rate 
(z~f)- Thus, the advantage to the bank can be determined by directly comparing CD 
and FICB rates. For the illiquid periods during the decade of 1974 through 1983 the 
average cost of FICB funds and the large bank CD rates were similar (table 32).
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Table 32. FICB VERSUS CD FUNDING DURING ILLIQUIDITY
Year Quarter
Cost of 
FICB Fundsa/ CD Ratek/
Advantage 
of FICB
1977 ill 7.2 6.1 -1.1
IV 7.8 7.0 -.8
1978 I 7.9 7.2 -.7
II 8.3 7.8 -.5
III 8.5 8.6 .1
IV 9.1 10.8 1.7
1979 I 10.0 10.8 .8
II 10.4 10.6 .2
III 10.6 11.4 .8
IV 11.3 14.3 3.0
1980 I 12.3 10.8 -1.5
0 12.9 12.0 -.9
Average
III 11.7 10.4 -1.3
-.02
a/ Effective FICB rate including capitalization stock cost.
b/ Average of offering rate quoted by five dealers; annualized and adjusted for
reserve requirements of three percent. CD quoted rate x 365/360
1.0 - .03
Summary and Conclusions
The need for alternative sources of funds for bank lending to agriculture was 
assessed using Call report data and a survey of New York State commercial banks. 
This was followed by an evaluation of two alternative funding sources: (1) an 
agricultural loan funding corporation similar to the MASI program currently available 
in the Midwest which sells agricultural loans to Rabobank, and (2) Federal 
Intermediate Credit Bank (FICB) discounting of loans through an agricultural credit 
corporation (ACC).
Call report data indicate that large banks with over $200 million in deposits were 
responsible for more than half of the volume of outstanding agricultural loans held by 
New York State banks outside of New York City. In comparison, the same size group 
of banks in the U.S. as a whole held a quarter of the volume while in the 12 MASI 
states such banks were responsible for only seven percent of agricultural lending. 
Survey results showed that New York State banks with more than $50 million in 
deposits and those banks with large existing agricultural portfolios were more likely to 
have increased their agricultural lending over the past five years and were also more 
likely to increase agricultural lending in the coming five years. Banks expected to 
increase shorter term agricultural production loans more rapidly than longer term 
agricultural real estate loans.
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Bankers considered funds to support one to five year loans as the most important 
term needed to increase agricultural loan volumes. Lack of longer term funds was a 
concern primarily at agricultural banks.
According to survey responses, the primary obstacle to increased agricultural 
lending by banks in the past as well as for the future is the strong competition 
provided by the Farm Credit System (FCS). The strength of FCS competition was 
attributed first to the lower interest rates offered and secondly to the longer terms 
for loans in general and the availability of long term loans for real estate purposes. 
The lack of loanable funds was rated as having been a relatively unimportant obstacle 
in the past. Agricultural banks (those with more than $2.5 million in agricultural loans 
and an agricultural loan to total loan ratio of 10 percent or greater), however, 
expected this to be the second most significant hinderance to agricultural lending in 
the future.
The source of funds that banks are most likely to use during periods of illiquidity 
is participations with other banks. Only large banks were likely to use certificates of 
deposits (CDs). A number of banks indicated they would buy Federal Funds.
To improve the competitive position of banks any alternate source of funds must 
not only increase the amount of funds available, it must do so at a competitive 
interest rate. The current problem is not primarily one of lack of funds but one of 
lack of low cost funds.
MASI is a corporation owned by 12 midwestern state banking associations 
through which participating banks can sell up to 80 percent of qualifying loans to 
Rabobank. Loans must be at least $25,000 in size and meet eligibility criteria 
established by Rabobank. Interest rates are fixed for up to 12 months and are based on 
current money market rates.
Although it is easy to illustrate the advantage of selling 80 percent of a loan 
when other good agricultural loans could be made with the released funds and there 
are no other sources of funds, the profitability of a MASI-like funding organization is 
less clear when other funding alternatives are available or when funds are abundant. 
During the 1977-80 period, when banks were generally illiquid, MASI costs were 0.4 
and 0.6 percent more expensive than loan participations or large bank CDs, 
respectively. It seems likely that many moderate sized banks could sell CDs at less 
than 0.6 percent above the large bank rate.
During periods of liquidity the profitability of a MASI-like alternative depends on 
the rate of return earned on funds released by use of MASI funds. Over the period of 
1974 to 1983 average MASI costs were estimated at 11.72 percent compared to rates 
of return on possible investments in CDs, Federal Funds, and three year Treasury 
Notes of 9.58, 9.72, and 10.18 percent, respectively. Thus, historical interest rate 
data suggest that a MASI-like funding program would not contribute significantly to 
improving the competitive position of banks in agricultural lending.
Given the characteristics of New York agricultural loans, the level of costs 
currently experienced by MASI and the 0.25 percent fee charged by MASI, the likely 
minimum northeastern area required to support a new intermediary would include the 
states of New York, New England, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and 
Ohio. In the short run it appears that the most feasible alternative for banks in these
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states who find the MASI alternative attractive is to join the existing MAS! program 
rather than develop a new intermediary.
The potential of the FICB program was also shown to be limited due to the 
stringent requirements that banks must meet in order to be eligible to discount loans 
with them. A minimum of 15 percent of a bank's loans must be in agriculture, there 
must be a continuous need for funds, the bank must be unable to directly tap national 
money markets and a minimum of $1.5 million must be discounted annually. Only 
seven New York State banks with a combined agricultural loan volume of $62 million, 
potentially meet these requirements.
During periods of illiquidity FICB funds averaged 1.1 percentage points below the 
cost of using participations. The cost of FICB funds was about the same as large bank 
CD costs, indicating that the cost advantage of FICB funding will equal the premium 
that a bank has to pay over the large bank CD rate. However, during periods of 
liquidity use of FICB funds resulted in an average disadvantage of 1.0, 1.1 or 1.2 
percentage points depending on whether released funds were invested in CDs, three 
year Treasury Notes or Federal Funds, respectively.
Over the entire 1974 to 1983 period, including periods of both liquidity and 
illiquidity, FICB funds were 0.3 percentage points less profitable than using 
participation during illiquid periods and investing excess funds in large bank CDs 
during liquid periods. Using less profitable investments such as three year Treasury 
Notes or Federal Funds during periods of liquidity increased the disadvantage of FICB 
funding. Based on historical (1974-83) interest rate data banks must be illiquid more 
than the average one third of the time to find this funding alternative attractive.
In summary, the results of this research indicate that neither a MASI-like 
intermediary nor FICB discounting are likely to significantly improve the competitive 
position of most New York Commercial Banks.
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Appendix A
MASI Capital Note Formula
Total Bank 
Deposits Assessment
a) $10 million or less $ 5,000
b) $10 million to $25 million $ 5,000 plus $150 per million 
over $10 million
c) $25 million to $50 million $ 7,250 plus $100 per million 
over $25 million
d) $50 million to $150 million $ 9,750 plus $50 per million 
over $50 million
e) Over $150 million $14,750
Example: A bank with $67 million in deposits would be assessed $9,750 plus 17 x $50
= $850 for a total of $10,600.
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Appendix B
A Sampling of MASI Loan Criteria!./
1. Any one loan may include a combination of several loan categories. In such
cases, the term of the loan must not exceed the shortest term of any such loan
category and the maximum loan amount will be determined by totaling the loan
amounts available for each loan category.
2. Seasonal Crop Production Loans
(a) The term must not exceed 365 days.
(b) Loan amounts will not exceed the lessor of 90 percent of scheduled 
production expenses or 70 percent of the projected value of the growing 
crops. The projected value of the growing crops will be determined by 
using the historical yields from the borrower's acreage and a unit price 
equal to the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT) futures price for the contract 
month nearest to the expected harvest date, adjusted for the local basis 
variance from the CBT price.
(c) Loans must be secured by a valid and perfected first priority security 
interest in the growing crops.
(d) In geographic regions periodically subject to severe storm damage, at least 
50 percent of the value of the growing crops must be covered by hail or all­
risk crop insurance.
(e) Loans will not be acceptable for participation earlier than 60 days prior to 
the scheduled planting date.
3. Seasonal Crop Inventory Loans
(a) The term must not exceed one year.
(b) Loan amounts must not exceed 70 percent of the estimated value of the 
crop inventory based on the local market price.
(c) Loans will be secured by a valid and perfected first priority security 
interest in the crop inventory or negotiable warehouse receipts covering 
the inventory.
(d) If crop inventory is stored on the borrower's farm, the amount, nature and 
quality of crop inventory and type of storage facility must be verified by 
the lending officer in an on-site inspection report. If stored o ff the farm, 
the originating bank must 1) be in possession of negotiable warehouse 
receipts from a bonded warehouseman or, 2) perfect the security interest 
by filing appropriate financing statements and verifying the amount, 
nature, quality and type of storage facility in an on-site inspection report.
1/ Taken from MASI, MABSCO Agricultural Services, Inc. pamphlet. Data on beef, 
hog, poultry and sheep are omitted.
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(e) The officers of the originating bank are required to conduct on-site 
verifications of the amount and condition of the crop inventory every 90 
days for the term of the loan, and maintain a record of the verifications in 
the borrower's credit file.
4. Equipment Loans
(a) The term must not exceed five years for new equipment and three years 
for used equipment.
(b) Loans must be secured by a valid and perfected first priority security 
interest pursuant to a security agreement which clearly describes and 
identifies each material item of the equipment by appropriate serial 
numbers.
(c) Loan amounts for the purchase of new equipment must not exceed the 
lesser of dealer's cost or 75 percent of the purchase price. Loan amounts 
for the purchase of used equipment must not exceed the lesser of 50 
percent of the current market value or 70 percent of the purchase price. 
Other loan amounts supported by a valid and perfected first security 
interest in used equipment must not exceed 50 percent of the current 
market value.
(d) The originating bank is required to verify annually during the term of the 
loan that the equipment is in good working condition ana is being properly 
maintained, based on an on-site inspection by a lending officer.
5. Dairy Loans , . ,
(a) The term for overall dairy operation/equipment/milk production loans must
not exceed a term that is acceptable to MAST
(b) The term must not exceed two years for calf to heifer dairy stock breeding 
operations.
(c) The term must not exceed 120 days for seasonal calf production for 
market.
(d) Loans must be secured by a valid and perfected first priority security 
interest pursuant to a security agreement which clearly describes and 
identifies all collateral.
(e) Loan amounts for total dairy production loans must not exceed 70 percent 
of appraised value of collateral, including the dairy herd.
(f) Loan amounts for calf and heifer production for market must not exceed 80 
percent of the appraised value of the stock. Appraisal must clearly 
identify all stock by breed, age and appropriate registration.
(g) Appraised value of collateral livestock is required to be updated annually 
by the originating bank following an on-site report by a lending officer.
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Appendix C
MASI Loan Scoring Matrix
CREDIT SCORING MATRIX
SCORE
Scoring Weighting
RATIOS:
1 2 3 4 5 6
Current Assets 
Current Liabilities ►  2.0 ►  1.5 to 2.0 ►  1.25 to 1.5 ►  1.1 to 1.25 ►  0.9 lo 1.1 *0.9 25
Intermediate (1-7 yr. file) Assets 
intermediate (1-7 yr. maturity) Liabilities ►  3.0 ►  2.5 to 3.0 ►  2.0 to 2.5 ►  1.5 to 2.0 ►  1.25 to 1.5 *1.25 10
Total Liabilities 
Net Worth *.50 .50 to *.75 .75 to -a 1.0 1.0 to *1.5 1.5 lo *2.0 ► 2.0 25
(Current Not Worth-Beginning Net Worth)
n
Prior Year Nel Worth ►  .20 ►  .15 to .20 ►  .10 to .15 ►  .05 to .10 ►  .01 to .05 *.01 30
Loan Amount
Value of Security *.50 .50 to *.00 .60 to *.75 .75 to *.65 .85 to *.95 ►  .95 10
WEIGHTING SCORE 100%
Definitions and interpretation of matrix of following page
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Definitions for MAS! Loan Scoring Matrix:
"Current Net Worth" means borrower's net worth on borrower's most recent fiscal 
year-end reduced by the amount of any increased loan valuation per acre since the 
fiscal year-end when the beginning net worth was ascertained. The value of land 
acquired or divested since the fiscal year-end when the beginning net worth was 
ascertained will not be considered for the purpose of this land value adjustment.
"Beginning Net Worth" means a borrower's net worth on borrower's fiscal year-end "n"
years preceding borrower's most recent fiscal year-end.
"n" means the number three or as otherwise provided for in the operations manual.
"Prior Year Net Worth" means the borrower's net worth on borrower's fiscal year-end 
next preceding borrower's most recent fiscal year-end.
Generally, a loan which scores 4.0 or less and conforms to the applicable loan 
criteria is acceptable to MASI. In such cases and where the participation amount is 
$250,000 or less, MASI can, at its discretion, approve and cause Rabobank to purchase 
the loan on the same day it is received.
When the participation amount exceeds $250,000, or where there are deviations 
from loan criteria, or if the loan scores in excess of 4.0, Rabobank makes the credit 
decision, and approval could take up to five business days.
Appendix D
EXHIBIT A
PARTICIPATION NOTICE
R a bo b a nk N e d e rla n d  ___
c/o  M A BS C O  A g r ic u ltu ra l S erv ices , Inc.
430 L ib e rty  B u ild in g  
D es M o ine s , Io w a  50308 
A tte n tio n : J im  C. P o tte r
M a s te r P a rtic ip a tio n  A greem en t 
b e tw e e n  th e  u nd e rs ig n e d  a nd  R abobank N e d e rla n d
G e n tle m e n :
d a te d  as o f 18________
19________
W e in te n d  to  m ake  a Loan (as d e fin e d  in th e  M a s te r P a rtic ip a tio n  A g re e m en t, te rm s  d e f in e d  th e re in  b e in g  
u se d  h ere in  as th e re in  d e fine d ) to  th e  B o rro w e r nam ed b e low .
P u rsu a n t to  the te rm s  and c o n d it io n s  o f th e  M a s te r P a rtic ip a tio n  A g re e m e n t, w e  h e re b y  o ffe r  to  R abobank 
N e de rla nd  a  P a r t ic ip a tio n  in the  Loan  or C o m m itte d  Loan  d e s c rib e d  b e low :
B o rro w e r: (a) N am e _  
{b) A dd re ss
(c> P lace  o f fo rm a tio n  o f p a rtn e rs h ip  o r in c o rp o ra tio n  ( if a p p l ic a b le ) .
(d) S ta te  & C o u n ty  o f  B us in e ss  _________________  . . -
(s) L ine(s) o f b u s in e s s  _____________________________________________
(f) Federa l Tax I.O ./S oc ia f S ec u rity  N o. (as a pp lica b le ) _____________
2. F in a n c ia l S ta te m e n t S um m ary  A s  o f
C u rre n t A s s e ts  
In te rm e d ia te  (1-7 year life )
A s s e t s ______________________________________
T o ta l A s s e ts __________________________________
19 ............. .
($000)
C u rre n t L ia b i l i t ie s _____________
In te rm e d ia te  (1-7 ye a r m a tu r ity )
L ia b i l i t ie s ______________________
N e t W o rth ______________________
3. H is to r ic a l N et W o rth  A d ju s te d  F o r C hanges in Land  V a lu a tio n  (pe r O p e ra tio n s  M anua l);
D ate : ..................................  .................................. ..................................  ........... ..... ...............
A m o u n t ($000): _________________ _ __________ _ _  ---------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Loan and /or C o m m itte d  Loan  in W h ic h  a P a rtic ip a tio n  is  O ffe red : C o m m itte d  Loan
Loan_______  ( if a p p lica b le )
(a) D a te  o f Loan  o r C o m m itm e n t ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) P rin c ip a l A m o u n t ___________________  ___________________
(c) A m o u n t O u ts ta n d in g  u n d e r C o m m itte d  Loan
a fte r  th is  Loan  D is b u rs e d  N /A  ---------------------- _ _ _
(d) In it ia l Loan Rate --------------------------------  --------------------------------
(e) T e rm s /B a s is  o l A d ju s tm e n ts  to  Loan Rate ( if any) -------------------------------- -------------------------------------------
(t) In it ia l P erce n ta g e  o f P a r t i c i p a t i o n ___________________________________ —  ■ ■■
(g) In it ia l P a rtic ip a tio n  R a te  ........................................................................................
(h) in it ia l  P a rtic ip a tio n  R a te  P erio d  -------------------------------- _ _ _ _ _ -------------------
(i) R epaym en t S ch ed u le  ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(j) P aym en t o f  in te re s t -------------------------------- -------------------------------------------
(k) F in a l E x p ira tio n /M a tu rity  -------------------------------- -------------------_ _ _ _ _
(l) C o lla te ra l --------------------------------  _ _ _ _ _ _ ------------
(m) V a lue  o f C o lla te ra l ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
(n) G ua ra n to r/O th e r S up p o rt --------------------------------  --------------------------------
(o) O th e r T e rm s -------------------------------- _ _ _ _ _ _ ------------
(p) Loan  C a te g o ry  (per Loan  C rite ria :)
(q) D e v ia tio n s  fro m  Loan  C rite ria :
(r) W h e th e r e x p e c te d  to  be rep a id  as agreed on  th e  s ta ted  m a tu r it ie s  d u ( o f  n o rm a l a n t ic ip a te d  cash  flo w :
Y E S ________ NO ___________ if  NO, p lease  e xp la in ;
(s) W h e th e r a t leas t 50%  o f the  va lue  o l the  g ro w in g  c ro p s  Is co ve red  by h a il o r a ll- r is k  c ro p  insu rance :
YES _______ NO . If NO. p lease e xp la in :
V ery Iru ly  y o u rs ,
I*.AM* OF :j„ . Si 'l„G
By
Title:
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Appendix E
o m m  wm m cm z im s t it b t io ii co m  w u « i o »  
wm  & m e w  bseatxonssxp  m m
gTOffi&L WTMTOI&TI CSfflIT M  (FICB)
«■ _____ ----------------------------------- ;---------/■' ■■.........—— ................ . .. »' '■ 1
m c n m  i  »  w u o w  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
The applicant ji® » 4 b « l «  fe@r©fef »Bs@s application fe® establish a financing
with the F1C8 to ®cs@g€asic® with the g#§ulfttiwiis established fey th® Par® Credit adatoistra'*
ties* (12 C.r.a. *14.4540 ®t. sag.) and policies and peoceduraa adopted by the tlCM.
1. f f l m m ____________ _ . fhaglg ------- _ . ~—■—«-»
J
ftdtlg® se __ ________ _ ___— ^ ■ -...............  ..... .
City State -—r **F , . ...... ..
t + . .  . n  r i  Bepository r “ S Proposed (H  BsUttog
(v a ll that apply) j j j   ^ L i  mstitution . LJ  Institution ^  Institution
2. CAPITAL STBBCTGM m  ot application data or proposed. I f  a new entity. (Gait $000)
a. Preferred Stock %
b. Ossmam, Stock $
c. Surplus $
d. □ndivided Profits $
Reeerves for contingencies
and other capital reserves $
Total ?
3. STOCffflO&SBlS wh© ewn (or would wn i f  proposed) 10% or more of shares outstandingi
4. PROJECTS DXSCOCOT WUIffi (next 3 years):
1st year 2nd year 3rd year
a. Seasons! peak > S ---- -™ —-
b. Estimated yearly average $ $_______ _____ $------------—
5. KSX MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL - names, t i t le ,  experience. (Briefly describe or attach 
resumes.)
a. Management; 
h. &g Loan O fficers;
2/14/82
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m m m  3 -  s ^ o iir o ir  btoxtoticm a i  ncwumTiow
(Complete as m  spplieant i f  fepw itory institution is checked on application Ssction 1 
at 1; also couplet® m  required at Section 2 tor each a ffilia ted  depository institution.)
Address:
peak m m  to s w s h  mm m a m m m  m m  mtios for u «t 3 years (omit ooo> 
C%ttaeh @f ca ll for peak quarters.)
e. Totala. Date fetal-
tefsosife®
<Sc * Loan® to 
Deposit®
<C -T- B)
%
e. Ag and f .  I  o f Ag I
Aquatic aqsssfei© Loans
Loans to fetal Loans
CB-T- C)
w w m rngr m w  PismraOTOT m  of •
tien ’ s bai®B€® sheet m  @fi application date.)
E ligible.ag @rS siqmtie Iowa rad®g eae-year
E lig ib le  i f  and aquatic■lean® on® to ten y ® «s 8
E lig ib le  & ia  real estate l®«n® with awstis@s$ 
jsaturifcies ten
fa r* real estate loans with aaturitiea
over ton '
business Iotm.
Cons;®M l«D i.
Bousing loan®.
Gmm®mt&X and hue 1m m  loans
(Attach depository institu*
Purchased
Total
j .  ¥©lum o f loans §wtsi<fe swrml tead® territory:
Participations
k. lorn®
l .  Total participations
SOT1CK OF m ^ m n  .FOifflS (p m k  aaount used in last 2 years) i 
■ ■ Corrent Twr
a. ,F@d®raI ®m « to iiseg«fits
b. Federal £™d$i purchased
e. fe ta l participations sold
d. Btaksrs acceptance®
e. eesBereial paper
£. fcgottebl® eertifieates S p o ilt  (of
$XIS®ffO®0 or @®r@)
a. Oth®r s _ . ____
loot
Sold
Previous Tear
explain k b  tm m cjm  m m o m i ,  ngeumraGi
a, Access to national ®r regional sonpy markets:
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- 3 “
f i r a o s  1 »  AVPLXCttlT (Cont.)
6. l o c w m e  r a t i
ft&M
Address C ity? §feat@
7, 1WLOTS H 8 E B  BOMDi .
fe ta l m w m & m  $ Dvduatlbl*, I f  w u r 1
Ihtotmc® M ^ a s f names _
H e.
Mir MS
state
assach a cow or to  isstitotios-s wmpm voucr.
m w m *  M BS M as  County (ie «) t Sfeat®(s)
IS SERB «  AlTXGftXXaw, action, proceeding or dispute before any court m  other juris- 
diction whid& might materially affeefe the institution? Q  He Q  re* ( I f  fas, 
explain In writing.)
IS APPLICAHT AFFILIATED with another financing institution? Q  So Q T es
88CTXOS8 2 AFFXLIJttlOH{8} (Coaplete and furnish information i f  applicant is an a ff ilia te .)
applicant is m  a f f i lia te  o f: nane(s)
2 .
P I  A single depository institution ( I f  checked, complete a separate Section 3 - Deposi­
tory Institution Information.)
n  Multiple depository institutions ( I f  checked, complete a separate Section 3 -  
Depository Institution Information, for each institution.}
f~1 Bank holding cos^any (Attach latest copy o f fisca l year end fH T-6 report.)
n  Other (Attach last certified  audit.)
a. L ist the iBMi ©f owners of the TOting stock o f each a ffilia ted  institution:
List the names o f com&qb management and employees:
List the na»s  of comon directors:
Describe the contractual and correspondent relationships between the institutions: 
Describe any prior business dealings between the a ffilia ted  institutions:
Da scribe the l ia b ility  inter relation ships between the a ffilia ted  institutions,
including but not limited to fund flows.
Page 48
- 4 -
